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Executive Summary 
 
In the United States, trade policy is generally considered an economic issue.  But for developing 
countries like the Dominican Republic, it can be a matter of life and death.   
 
This report, the culmination of seven months of research by students at Georgetown University 
Law Center, seeks to shed light on how the intellectual property provisions of the Dominican 
Republic – Central America – United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) are being 
implemented in the Dominican Republic and the impact that the Agreement is likely to have on 
access to medicine there.   
 
Although intellectual property protections are just one of many factors that impact the price of 
medicines, their effect can be significant.  Strong intellectual property laws limit competition in 
the pharmaceutical market, and, in so doing, can keep the price of medicines considerably 
higher than they would otherwise be. For example, the introduction of generic HIV/AIDS 
medications contributed to a 99% reduction in the price of anti-retrovirals internationally over 
the last decade, and international generic competition reduced the price of the HIV/AIDS 
medication KALETRA® by fifty-five percent in the Dominican Republic.   
 
High pharmaceutical prices can be devastating for the government and individuals.  They strain 
already-stretched public health budgets and leave some patients with the choice of paying for 
medications out-of-pocket or forgoing treatment in order to fund life’s other necessities. When 
life-saving medicines are priced out of reach in developing countries, people die.  
 
The international community addressed the balance between intellectual property protection 
and public health in the 1995 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) and the Doha Declaration in 2001.  TRIPS, which is binding on all members of the 
World Trade Organization, mandates minimum intellectual property standards and allows for 
certain “flexibilities” (e.g. parallel importation and compulsory licensing) to protect public 
health.  The Doha Declaration, pursued by developing countries in response to difficulties in 
accessing affordable medicines, affirms the rights of states to use these flexibilities and makes 
clear that TRIPS can and should be interpreted to protect public health. 
 
In contrast, DR-CAFTA, like a number of other free trade agreements the United States has 
negotiated with developing countries, imposes intellectual property protections that require 
obligations beyond those required in TRIPS.  These heightened obligations have limited 
competition in the pharmaceutical market and resulted in increased prices for life-saving 
medicines, with devastating effects on public health. 
 
In the Dominican Republic, the cost of medicine is a concern for the government and 
consumers. The Dominican government spends one-fourth of its health budget purchasing 
medicines, and government health insurance only covers about one third of Dominicans. Thus, 
the burden of purchasing life-saving medicines falls largely on individual Dominicans. As the 
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Dominican Republic attempts to extend health insurance coverage to all, heightened 
intellectual property protections, such as those in DR-CAFTA, could increase the price of 
medicines in a manner that overwhelms government efforts and leaves the burden of 
purchasing life-saving medicines on individuals who often do not have the means to do so. 
 
Further, although the Dominican Republic receives international funding, this support only 
subsidizes a limited number of drugs and diseases. This assistance, though generous, may not 
always be available or sufficient, and raises concerns about the ability of the Dominican 
government to protect public health in the event of an interruption or decrease in aid. 
Moreover, even with such funding, patients are not always able to secure the drugs they need 
because of high pharmaceutical prices. For example, interviews suggested that some Dominican 
HIV/AIDS patients may be kept on first-line drugs when they should be moved to expensive 
second-line treatments because of cost concerns.  
 
The Dominican government’s ability to address these public health challenges may be limited 
by the promotion of stringent intellectual property protections by the U.S. government and the 
multinational pharmaceutical industry. Further, concern was expressed that U.S. technical 
assistance to the Dominican Republic provides information about DR-CAFTA obligations without 
equal information about public health safeguards that could be implemented. Without 
information about public health safeguards, DR-CAFTA could be implemented in a manner that  
is potentially devastating for Dominican patients. 
 
During the negotiations over DR-CAFTA, the United States used its strong bargaining position to 
include heightened intellectual provisions such as “patent extensions,” which can lengthen the 
term of a patent to compensate for administrative delays; “data exclusivity,” which limits the 
use of test data by generic manufacturers in seeking marketing approval; and “patent linkage,” 
which requires the agency responsible for ensuring drug safety and efficacy to also verify the 
non-existence of a patent. 
 
Similar requirements in other countries have led to delays in the introduction of generic 
competition and have had devastating effects on access to affordable medicines. If these 
obligations have a similar effect in the Dominican Republic, as is projected, the public health 
system could be threatened and lives could be lost.  
 
In recognition of the negative consequences that these heightened intellectual property 
provisions have on developing countries, the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House 
of Representatives and the Office of the United States Trade Representative announced a New 
U.S. Trade Policy in May 2007. This New U.S. Trade Policy withdrew obligations on trading 
partners to adopt certain heightened intellectual property obligations for pharmaceuticals and 
reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the Doha Declaration.  The free trade agreement that the 
United States signed with Peru already reflects this change in U.S. policy. Bringing Dominican 
obligations under DR-CAFTA in line with this new U.S. approach is needed if the country is to 
avert a public health crisis and lives are to be saved. 
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To promote access to affordable pharmaceuticals in the Dominican Republic, the Georgetown 
Human Rights Action/Human Rights Institute Fact-Finding Team makes the following 
recommendations to the Government of the United States of America: 
 
1. The United States should bring DR-CAFTA implementation in line with the New U.S. 
Trade Policy, specifically:  
a. Patent extensions for pharmaceuticals should be made optional. 
b. At a minimum, data exclusivity should be limited to “a reasonable period” for 
undisclosed and required data, and should protect only new chemical 
entities. Data exclusivity should also be subject to an exception to protect 
public health in accordance with the Doha Declaration. 
c. Patent linkage systems should be optional, clearly allowing countries to place 
the burden on patent holders to enforce their rights. 
 
2. The United States should ensure that training and funding are provided in a way that 
strengthens the Dominican Republic’s capacity to implement pro-public health 
policies, including training on public health safeguards such as those provided in 
TRIPS and U.S. law in addition to DR-CAFTA obligations. 
 
3. The United States should publicly recognize the right of the Dominican Republic and 
other trade partners to use TRIPS flexibilities consistent with U.S. commitments 
under the Doha Declaration. In future negotiations, the United States should refrain 
from promoting intellectual property provisions that inhibit a government’s ability to 
advance public health. 
 
To promote access to affordable pharmaceuticals in the Dominican Republic, the Georgetown 
Human Rights Action/Human Rights Institute Fact-Finding Team makes the following 
recommendations to the Government of the Dominican Republic: 
 
1. The Dominican Republic should utilize TRIPS flexibilities where necessary to protect 
public health. To this end, the Dominican Republic should consider: 
a. Identifying public health needs that merit the use of TRIPS flexibilities. 
b. Clarifying and publicizing the procedures for obtaining a compulsory license. 
c. Providing training on TRIPS flexibilities to relevant government agencies and 
civil society. 
 
2. The Dominican Republic should further study and address the effects that 
intellectual property laws can have on access to medicine in the Dominican Republic. 
To this end, the Dominican Republic should consider: 
a. Commissioning a study on access to medicine in the Dominican Republic. 
b. Promoting more active involvement of health officials in trade and 
intellectual property negotiations. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Each year, millions of people in developing countries die because they cannot afford 
medications.1 Intellectual property rights are a key factor affecting medicine prices. While they 
are intended to provide incentives for innovation, they also create limited monopolies that 
allow high prices to be set and maintained for life-saving drugs.2 As the United States presses 
for more stringent intellectual property protections in free trade agreements,3 it has a moral 
obligation to consider the life and death impact of its trade policy. 
 
The struggles of individuals in the Dominican Republic are representative of the challenges 
faced by many in the developing world. Public health is just one of the many burdens 
governments bear. With limited resources stretched to cover pressing concerns ranging from 
crime control to clean water, developing countries like the Dominican Republic are often unable 
to provide their citizens with the medications they desperately need4 and many Dominicans are 
forced to pay for their own treatment costs.5 In 2001, the Dominican Republic enacted social 
security reform legislation intended to provide universal health coverage to all Dominican 
citizens.6 As the social security system covers more citizens and diseases, the Dominican 
government may be overwhelmed by the price of medications, thereby forcing private citizens 
to continue to pay for their own treatment.7 Patients may have to make difficult decisions such 
as choosing between medicine and food.8 
 
Unfortunately, individuals in developing countries like the Dominican Republic are often the 
least able to afford the medication they need. Because a typical Dominican woman earns less 
                                                          
1
 See World Health Assembly, Public health, innovation and intellectual property, W.H.A. 60.30, at ¶ 3, 66nd Ass. 
(May 24, 2007) (“[A]ccess to medicines … is hampered by … lack of resources and prices that are beyond the reach 
of many in the developing world.”).  
2
 Medecins Sans Frontieres, The impact of patents on access to medicines, http://www.msfaccess.org/main/access-
patents/introduction-to-access-and-patents/the-impact-of-patents-on-access-to-medicines/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2010). 
3
 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trade Facts: USTR’s Mission to Protect U.S. Intellectual 
Property Rights, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset_upload_file285_13523.pdf at 
¶ 2 (Nov. 2007) (last visited Mar. 6, 2010).  
4
 See Josh Ruxin, et. al., Emerging Consensus in HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and access to essential 
medicines, 365 LANCET, 618, 618 (2005) (“[P]oorest countries face enormous hurdles to achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals for health, let alone the broader goal of health for all their citizens.”). 
5
 See MAGDALENA RATHE, ET AL., MEDICAMENTOS Y PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL: EVALUACION DEL IMPACTO DE LOS 
NUEVOS ESTANDARES DE DERECHOS DE PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL EN EL PRECIO DE LOS MEDICAMENTOS: EL CASO DE 
LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA, at 20 (2009). 
6
 See Ley No. 87-01, Ley que crea el Sistema Dominicano de Seguridad Social, Santo Domingo, Dominican 
Republic, 2001. 
7
 See discussion infra Part III. 
8
 Interview with nurse, Buen Samaritano Hospital, January 14, 2010, La Romana, Dominican Republic (on file with 
authors). See also Disease Control Priorities Project, Ensuring Supplies of Drugs and Vaccines in Developing 
Countries, Without Medicines Patients Die Needlessly, http://www.dcp2.org/file/220/dcpp-drugsandvaccines-
web.pdf (Oct. 2008) (last visited March 6, 2010) (“[I]n most developing countries, consumers typically pay out of 
pocket for drugs, often sacrificing months or years of income to get well….”). 
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than $200 USD per month9 and likely has no health insurance,10 a diagnosis of Hepatitis B would 
be crippling to her health and her family. In Santo Domingo, the cost for a standard Hepatitis B 
treatment is $337.11 USD per week (over $19,400 USD for a full course).11 Thus, a Dominican 
woman like the one described may be forced to find a way to pay for a drug that costs over 
seven times her annual income.12 Without treatment, she will face liver failure and death.  
 
Although patients may not know why their medicines are so expensive, intellectual property 
rights can dramatically affect drug prices.13 With this relationship in mind, intellectual property 
laws should be enacted with the understanding that innovation incentives must be balanced 
with the public interest in using and benefitting from new products and processes.14 Though 
desirable, these innovation incentives do not negate the need to accommodate public health 
concerns. Rather, public health should be a key consideration in setting optimal levels of 
intellectual property protection. 
 
In 2007, the United States shifted its trade policy partly in recognition that certain types of 
intellectual property provisions, though perhaps incentivizing innovation, can undermine public 
health.15 This shift in trade policy (“New U.S. Trade Policy”) imposes less stringent protections 
on other developing countries. The Dominican Republic, however, has not been offered similar 
provisions. 
 
This report analyzes the impact of intellectual property protection on access to medicines in the 
Dominican Republic, with a specific focus on the provisions of the Dominican Republic-Central 
American-United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).16 As the United States successfully 
advocates for higher levels of intellectual property protection,17 developing countries risk 
detrimentally shifting the delicate balance between intellectual property and public health and 
burdening those least able to pay. The right to the highest attainable standard of health is 
                                                          
9
 This extrapolation is based on statistical data from the Oficina Nacional de Estadìstica, available at 
http://www.one.gob.do/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2010). 
10
 In 2002, only 21% of Dominicans were covered by some type of health insurance. PAN-AMERICAN HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION, HEALTH SYSTEMS PROFILE: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 19 (3rd ed. Oct. 2007) [hereinafter PAHO]. 
11
 Interview with health official, Secretaria de Estado de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social (SESPAS), January 14, 
2010, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (on file with authors). According to the official, treatment for Hepatitis 
B in the Dominican Republic is Pegasys, a drug produced by Roche, and the weekly cost of Pegasys is about 
$347.11 USD (12,600 RD) per week required for 56 weeks Id. The exchange rate used is 1 USD = 36.3000 RD. 
12
 Calculation based on the cost of Pegasys for one year ($337.11 USD per week x 52 weeks = $17,529 USD) 
divided by total income ($2400 USD). 
13
 United Kingdom Comm‟n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Final Report, 
http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm, at Ch. 2, 36 (Sept. 12, 2002) (last visited Mar. 
6, 2010) (“The importance of prices of medicines to poor consumers in developing countries is perhaps obvious.”). 
14
 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (intellectual property designed to “[p]romote … progress”). 
15
 See discussion infra Part IV. 
16
 Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004 [hereinafter DR-
CAFTA] available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-
central-america-fta/final-text. 
17
 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Intellectual Property, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
topics/intellectual-property at ¶¶ 1-3 (noting that the Office “uses a wide range of bilateral and multilateral trade 
tools to promote strong intellectual property laws and effective enforcement worldwide”). 
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internationally recognized as one of the fundamental rights of every human being.18 While the 
Dominican Republic currently faces severe resource constraints and struggles to provide its 
citizens with the medications they desperately need, the effects of DR-CAFTA could have 
potentially deadly results. Increasing intellectual property protections at the expense of public 
health comes at a legal, moral and possibly mortal cost. 
 
A. The Human Right to Health 
 
The right to the highest attainable standard of health is internationally recognized as one of the 
fundamental rights of every human being. Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights provides that “*e+veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and his family, including . . . medical care . . . .”19 Similarly, Article 12 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognizes “the 
right . . . to the . . . highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”20 The right to 
health may implicate related human rights, including the right to life, education, work and the 
benefits of scientific progress.21  
 
The right to health and related human rights are inextricably connected with the right to 
affordable medicines. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which interprets 
the ICESCR, has indicated that the right to health includes economic accessibility.22 Such an 
obligation means that “health facilities, goods and services must be affordable for all” and 
“poorer households should not be disproportionately burdened with health expenses. . . .”23  
 
The Dominican Republic has legal obligations with respect to the right to health. On January 4, 
1978,24 the Dominican Republic acceded to the ICESCR and, as such, is bound by its provisions 
that require progressive realization of the right to health for its citizens.25 Thus, the Dominican 
Republic must take steps toward the full realization of the right to health and refrain from 
                                                          
18
 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
19
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, Art. 25(1), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. 
Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].  
20
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st 
Sess., Supp. No. 16, Art. 12, U.N. Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
21
 Access to medicine may also implicate the right to “life,” “education,” and “work,” UDHR, supra note 19, at Art. 
3, 25(1), 23 (right to “life,” “education, and “work), ICESCR, supra note 20, at Art. 15 (right to the benefits of 
scientific progress), and the rights of the child, Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 
44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989) (right to the benefits of scientific progress). 
 
22
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health, ¶ 12 (b), 22nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000). 
23
 Id. 
24
 See United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en, at 
Dominican Republic (last visited Mar. 6, 2010). 
25
 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, at Art. 11 (May 23, 1969) (“The 
consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature … or accession.”). 
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adopting laws or policies that would diminish the availability or affordability of medicines.26 As 
a party to the ICESCR, the Dominican Republic has three duties in relation to the right to health: 
1) to “respect,” or refrain from interfering directly or indirectly, with the right to health; 2) to 
“protect” the right to health, which includes taking steps to ensure that non-state actors do not 
interfere with the right to health; and 3) to “fulfill” the right to health through appropriate 
legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures.27  
 
The United States signed the ICESCR in 1977 but has not ratified it,28 and therefore must refrain 
from acts that “defeat the object and purpose of *the+ treaty.”29 In addition, the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on the Highest Attainable Standard of Health has indicated that developed 
countries should not encourage developing countries to accept intellectual property standards 
that do not provide public health safeguards, especially in the context of a bilateral or 
multilateral trade agreement.30 This obligation can reasonably be interpreted to prohibit 
signatories like the United States from attempting to constrain the ability of states to address 
pressing public health challenges through free trade agreements.  
 
Thus, in addition to moral responsibilities, both the Dominican Republic and the United States 
have legal obligations with respect to the right to health.31 Findings in this report raise 
questions about whether such obligations are being met. 
 
 B. Methodology 
 
The Georgetown Human Rights Action/Human Rights Institute Fact-Finding Team, a group of 
nine students and two professors from the Georgetown University Law Center, conducted a 
fact-finding mission in the Dominican Republic. The primary goal of the mission was to 
determine how DR-CAFTA is being implemented in the Dominican Republic and the potential 
future impact of the Agreement on the right to health. Although factors ranging from 
                                                          
26
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health, ¶ 32 22nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000). (“[T]here is a strong presumption 
that retrogressive measures taken in relation to the right to health are not permissible.”). [hereinafter CESCR]. 
27
 Id. at ¶ 39. (“States Parties should ensure that the right to health is given due attention in international agreements 
…. In relation to the conclusion of other international agreements, States Parties should take steps to ensure that 
these instruments do not adversely impact on the right to health.”) 
28
 See United Nations Treaty Collection, supra note 24, at United States. 
29
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 25, at Art. 18. Though the United States is not a party to 
the Vienna Convention, its provisions have been recognized the Department of State as customary international law. 
Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT‟L. L. 431, 
443 (2004). 
30
 Paul Hunt & Rajat Khosla, The human right to medicines, 8 INT‟L J. HUM. RTS., 98, 105 (June 2008) (“In the 
context of medicines, this responsibility means that no rich State should encourage a developing country to accept 
intellectual property standards that do not take into account the safeguards and flexibilities included under the 
TRIPS agreement. In other words, developed States should not encourage a developing country to accept „TRIPS-
Plus‟ standards in any bilateral or multilateral trade agreement.”) 
31
 See World Health Organization, Comm‟n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Innovation and Public Health, Public 
health, innovation and intellectual property right: report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 
Innovation and Public Health, at 9 (2006) (“The moral obligation [to provide access to medicines for all] is backed 
by a legal imperative.”). 
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discrimination to quality of medications affect health in the Dominican Republic, the project 
focused exclusively on intellectual property rights. The mission’s focus was selected by the 
members of the student group Georgetown Human Rights Action from a number of student 
proposals. Team members were selected from applications solicited from the student body as a 
whole.  Funding for the project was provided by the Human Rights Institute at the Georgetown 
University Law Center.  
 
The Team spent the fall semester of 2009 studying relevant international intellectual property 
agreements, Dominican and U.S. law, and international human rights law. The Team also 
interviewed representatives of civil society and academia in the United States, who consulted in 
the development of the research project.  
 
The “fact-finding” occurred primarily during interviews conducted from January 11th through 
January 15th, 2010, in Santo Domingo and La Romana, Dominican Republic. In total, the Team 
interviewed fifty-two individuals in the Dominican Republic, including patients, healthcare 
providers, American and Dominican government officials, members of non-governmental 
organizations, representatives from the multinational and domestic pharmaceutical industries, 
and Dominican lawyers. Interviews were generally held in the interviewee’s office or in a health 
care facility. Informed consent was obtained for all interviews. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Upon returning to the Washington, D.C., the Team consolidated its findings and recommendations into 
this report. 
Interviews Conducted in the Dominican Republic 
January 11 to January 15, 2010 
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II. Intellectual Property & Public Health  
 
Increased intellectual property protections, such as those in DR-CAFTA, can raise the price of 
medicines.32 Upward pressure on drug prices is particularly devastating in developing countries, 
such as the Dominican Republic, where resources are limited and purchasing high-priced 
pharmaceuticals can divert funding from other pressing priorities.33 Although intellectual 
property is only part of a broad set of issues that affect access to medicines,34 its impact on 
price remains a serious concern. 
 
Intellectual property rights are legal monopolies over creations of the mind.35 Patents may be 
the most recognized form of intellectual property protection, but this protection comes in a 
number of different shapes and sizes.36 Regardless of the specific type of intellectual property 
right, all such rights operate by excluding competition, and thereby allow patent-holding 
companies to charge higher prices than those that would exist on an open market.37  
 
Pharmaceutical companies argue that their high prices are justified to reimburse investment in 
discovery,38 but the actual cost of developing a new medicine is contested and may not be as 
high as industry claims.39 A recent study shows that U.S. pharmaceutical companies spend twice 
as much on marketing as on research and development.40 And, in 2008, the pharmaceutical 
industry’s profits were nearly twice that of the oil and gas industry.41 Although high prices may 
create powerful incentives for creation, they also act as barriers to the right to health by placing 
                                                          
32
 United Kingdom Comm'n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, supra note 13, at 37. 
33
 See Carsten Fink, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: an Economic Perspective, in The Global Debate on the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights and Developing Countries, Issue Paper No.22, at xv (ICTSD, 2009). 
34
 See, e.g., World Health Organization, supra note 31, at 6 (noting that health outcomes depend on many factors 
such as economic growth, income distribution, nutrition, education, public health measures, and medicine). 
“[I]nnovation for „medicines and other products‟ must be situated within a wider picture of efforts across sectors to 
improve health and development.” Id. at 7. 
35
 See Earl W. Kintner & Jack L. Lahr, An Intellectual Property Law Primer 7–11 (Clark Boardman Company, Ltd. 
1982) (1975). 
36
 See, e.g., discussion infra Part IV.B. 
37
 World Health Organization, supra note 31, at 20 (noting that the validity of justification for patents is context-
specific because “where most consumers of health products are poor … the monopoly costs associated with patents 
can limit the affordability of patented health-care products required by poor people in the absence of other measures 
to reduce prices or increase funding”). 
38
 Companies claim that the research and development of a successful drug costs between 800 million to one billion 
dollars. Brochure from Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Drug Discovery and Development: 
Understanding the R&D Process 10 (2007), available at 
http://www.innovation.org/drug_discovery/objects/pdf/RD_Brochure.pdf. 
39
 See Bob Young & Michael Surrusco, Rx R&D Myths: The Case Against the Drug Industry’s R&D Scare Card, 
PUBLIC CITIZEN CONGRESS WATCH 2-12, July 2001, available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACFDC.PDF. 
40
 Marc-André Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion 
Expenditures in the United States, 5-1 PLoS Medicine 29, 32 (Jan. 2008) (discussing the disparity in estimates of 
money spent on research and development and estimating that more than twice is spent on promotion as is spent on 
research and development).   
41
 See Fortune 500, Top industries: Most profitable, 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2009/performers/industries/profits/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2010). 
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medicines beyond the reach of many people in developing countries.42 Serious moral and legal 
questions may be raised when life-saving drugs cost many times a person’s annual income.  
 
The connection between intellectual property obligations and public health has been vigorously 
debated by civil society, industry, and international organizations.43 Two major international 
documents address intellectual property rights and public health concerns: the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)44 and the Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health (Doha Declaration).45 Whether these international documents achieve an 
appropriate balance between intellectual property rights and public health is a matter still 
widely debated.46 However, when the international community or individual states introduce 
additional obligations that go beyond TRIPS and that contravene the flexibilities for public 
health that are affirmed under the Doha Declaration, such as in the case of DR-CAFTA, the 
consequences can be dire. The high prices for medicines that may result can be a death 
sentence to impoverished individuals in developing countries.  
 
A. TRIPS: Establishing International Intellectual Property Standards 
 
TRIPS, signed in 1995,47 introduced minimum international intellectual property standards. 
Because the agreement falls under the umbrella of the World Trade Organization (WTO), its 
obligations are imposed on all WTO members and thus it has an exceedingly far reach.48 TRIPS, 
largely the result of U.S. efforts,49 marked the first time that states were required to patent 
pharmaceutical products and processes.50 Prior to TRIPS, governments had broad flexibility to 
adopt the intellectual property regimes of their choosing and many states excluded 
pharmaceuticals from patentability.51 Thus, subjecting life-saving medicines to a twenty-year 
                                                          
42
 See Médicins Sans Frontières, Drug Patents Under the Spotlight: Sharing Practical Knowledge about 
Pharmaceutical Patents, http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4913e/s4913e.pdf, at 2 (March 2003); see also 
CESCR, supra note 26, at ¶ 12 (b). 
43
 See Peter M. Gerhart, Symposium: The International Intellectual Property Regime Complex: The Tragedy of 
TRIPS, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 143, 145 (2007) (addressing the “diverse” literature on international intellectual 
property law that has “grown enormously” since TRIPS and revolves around the topics of efficacy and fairness). 
44
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS]. 
45
 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/11, 41 I.L.M. 746 
[hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
46
 See Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformations: The WTO as a Distributive Organization, 17 AM. U. INT‟L L. REV. 
1045, 1079-81 (2002) (arguing that the Doha Declaration “tips the balance of the WTO toward flexibility and 
recognition”). 
47
 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, 
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2010). 
48
 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, Intellectual property: protection and 
enforcement, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2010). 
49
 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS 270-71 (2006). 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. 
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patent monopoly was a dramatic shift in international intellectual property protection.52 
 
However, in an attempt to balance these new obligations, TRIPS also recognizes the right of 
states to “adopt measures necessary to protect public health,”53 and grants considerable 
freedom in implementing intellectual property provisions through so-called “TRIPS 
flexibilities.”54 These flexibilities legally allow states to provide for the public health of their 
citizens.55 For example, states have some flexibility in how they define what inventions meet 
the criteria to obtain a patent.56 Members are also allowed to determine whether or not to 
permit parallel imports, the import of a patented good that was originally sold with the 
permission of the right-holder in another country.57 Finally, members may choose to allow 
compulsory licensing, by giving a third party, such as a generic drug manufacturer or 
government, the right to use a patented product or process without authorization from the 
patent owner subject in most cases to adequate remuneration and other conditions.58 These 
flexibilities are designed to allow states to implement intellectual property provisions in a way 
that does not undermine the right to health.59 DR-CAFTA, negotiated in 2004, significantly 
erodes the ability to utilize these flexibilities by requiring intellectual property protections that 
go beyond a country’s TRIPS obligations.60  
 
B. Doha Declaration: Reinforcing TRIPS’ Public Health Commitment 
 
Although TRIPS guaranteed the use of some public health safeguards, developed countries like 
the United States continued to pressure developing countries to strengthen intellectual 
                                                          
52
 See ELLEN F.M. ‟T HOEN, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL MONOPOLY POWER: DRUG PATENTS, 
ACCESS, INNOVATION, AND THE APPLICATION OF THE WTO DOHA DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 7 
(AMB Publishers 2009). 
53
TRIPS, supra note 44, at Art. 8(1). 
54
 See J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 
N.Y.U. J. INT‟L L. & POL. 11, 28 (1997) (concluding that TRIPS “leaves developing countries ample „wiggle 
room‟ in which to implement national policies favoring the public interest in free competition”); JAYASHREE 
WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7 (2001) (highlighting the 
“constructive ambiguity” in TRIPS). 
55
 See James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Heath Under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 291, 301 (2002) (indicating that the language of the 
Doha Declaration, “cast in terms of members‟ rights to protect public health introduces an interpretation not 
expressly provided in the TRIPS Agreement”). 
56
 See TRIPS, supra note 44, at Art. 27(1). Patents must be available for products or processes that are “new, involve 
an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.” Id. However, the meaning and level of “inventive” could 
differ between Member States, creating room for flexibility in interpretation.   
57
 See id. at Art. 6. 
58
 See id. at Arts. 30-31. Generally, compulsory licenses are thought to fall under Article 31. See, e.g., Christopher 
Garrison, Exceptions to Patent Rights in Developing Countries, ISSUE PAPER NO. 17 at 2 (UNCTAD - ICTSD 
Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development 2006). However, use under Article 30 is also without permission of 
the right holder. See TRIPS, supra note 44, at Art. 30. 
59
 See Doha Declaration, supra note 45 at ¶ 4 (“[T]he TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members 
from taking measures to protect public health… we reaffirm the right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the 
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.”). 
60
 See generally DR-CAFTA, supra note 16; see also World Health Organization, supra note 31, at 22 (identifying 
the “growing number of bilateral and free trade agreements which include higher standards of protection that erode 
these flexibilities”). See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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property protections and refrain from using these flexibilities to protect public health.61 Many 
of these pressure tactics, such as trade disputes and litigation in Brazil, Thailand, and South 
Africa, garnered high-profile media criticism.62 In the wake of these controversies, developing 
countries used the 2001 WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar as a platform to bring 
access to medicines to the forefront of the World Trade Organization.63  
 
The resulting binding interpretative text, the Doha Declaration, affirms the sovereign right of 
governments to fully utilize TRIPS flexibilities, including compulsory licensing and parallel 
importation, to protect public health.64 The Declaration states that TRIPS can and should be 
interpreted to protect public health and promote access to affordable medicines.65 However, in 
the years since the Declaration, developing countries have been subjected to pressure in the 
form of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, like DR-CAFTA, that increase intellectual 
property rights at the expense of public health.66 
 
C. Competition: Driving Down Drug Prices 
 
Competition in pharmaceutical markets generally lowers the price of medicines.67 For example, 
the introduction of generic anti-retroviral medication to treat HIV/AIDS is credited with 
contributing to the 99% reduction in the cost of HIV/AIDS treatments over the past decade.68 
With the introduction of competition, brand-name manufacturers are forced to lower prices in 
order to maintain a profitable market share.69 
                                                          
61
 „T HOEN, supra note 52, at 20-24. Contra Press Release, Office of United States Trade Representative [hereinafter 
USTR], USTR Zoellick says World has Chosen Path of Hope, Openness, Development and Growth (Nov. 14, 2001) 
(noting that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative immediately praised the Declaration as a “landmark 
political declaration” and “a good example of developed and developing nations advancing common goals”). 
62
 „T HOEN, supra note 52, at 21-29. 
63
 See Gathii, supra note 55, at 296. 
64
 Doha Declaration, supra note 45, at ¶ 4-5.  
65
 Id. at ¶¶ 3-4. 
66
 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV‟T. REFORM, 109D CONGRESS., TRADE AGREEMENTS AND ACCESS TO 
MEDICATIONS UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, at 6 (Comm. Print 2005) (finding that “contrary to the Doha 
Declaration, U.S. trade negotiators have repeatedly used the trade agreements to restrict the ability of developing 
nations to acquire medicines at affordable prices”). 
67
 Theodore C. Bailey, Innovation and Access: The Role of Compulsory Licensing in the Development and 
Distribution of HIV/AIDS Drugs, 2001 I.L. TECH. & POL‟Y 193, 204 (2001). “The difference between a 
monopolistic and a competitive market can have a profound effect on the price of a drug, as evidenced by the drastic 
drop in price that occurs when patent protection for drugs cease.” Id. 
68
 Medecins Sans Frontieres, supra note 2, at ¶ 4.  
69
 Id. at ¶¶ 2-4 (“The most effective and sustainable way to bring down the price of a drug is through competition 
between manufacturers.”). 
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The Effects of Generic Competition70 
Cost of Triple-Combination AIDS Treatment May 2000 - August 2001 
 
 
Compulsory licensing is one tool that harnesses the power of competition to break the lock of 
intellectual property monopolies and lower the price of medicines. For example, the Dominican 
government could grant a compulsory license to a third party, such as a generic drug 
manufacturer, to produce Hepatitis B or HIV/AIDS medication.71 The patent holder would 
receive some payment for the license72 and the additional production source would inject 
competition into the market, which may reduce high medicine prices.73 The Dominican 
government has never issued a compulsory license, though it has considered doing so in the 
past.74 
 
                                                          
70
 Data from Médecins Sans Frontières (2001) “A matter of life and death: The role of patents in access to essential 
medicines” http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2001/doha_11-2001.pdf (last visited Mar. 
22, 2010). The graph depicts the effect of generic competition on the lowest world price per patient per year of 
stavudine (d4T) + lamivudine (3TC) + nevirapine triple combination therapy. 
71
 „T Hoen, supra note 52, at 39. 
72
 TRIPS, supra note 44, at Art. 31(b). 
73
 See Bailey, supra note 67, at 204. 
74
 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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Increasing intellectual property protections could result in the Dominican Republic being unable 
to take advantage of international generic competition. Pharmaceutical companies only face 
competition in countries where intellectual property provisions allow generic alternatives.75 For 
example, Abbott Laboratories reduced the price of KALETRA® in the Dominican Republic when 
faced with a Thai compulsory license.76 Had KALETRA® been patented in the Dominican 
Republic, the price of KALETRA® could have remained prohibitively high because Abbott would 
not have been forced to compete with the generic alternative.77 Thus, if attention is not paid to 
domestic intellectual property protections, Dominicans may not reap the benefits of generic 
competition internationally. 
The negative ramifications of overly protective intellectual property laws exist despite 
differences between the Dominican pharmaceutical manufacturing market and that of the 
developed world. Because of limitations in the Dominican market such as small size and the 
presence of branded generics (i.e. generic pharmaceuticals with advanced marketing 
campaigns),78 some Dominican-produced generics may not realize the same low price levels as 
unbranded or internationally-produced generics.79 Thus, addressing intellectual property 
                                                          
75
 THE WORLD BANK, BATTLING HIV/AIDS: A DECISION MAKER‟S GUIDE TO THE PROCUREMENT OF MEDICINES 
AND RELATED SUPPLIES 112 (Yolanda Tayler, ed., 2004) (“If a medicine or supply is not protected by intellectual 
property rights (such as a patent) in the country of importation, intellectual property rights will not constitute an 
obstacle for the procurement authority.”). 
76
 See discussion infra KALETRA® in the Dominican Republic: Competition Through Compulsory Licenses 
77
 See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 75, at 12 (“If generic medicines are available from foreign suppliers, this does 
not necessarily mean that they can be lawfully imported because the originator may hold a patent “in-country” and 
may try to use it to block importation.”). 
78
 Interview with representative of the generic industry, Industrias Farmacéuticas Dominicana (INFADOMI), 
January 11, 2010, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (on file with authors). 
79
 See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 384-85 (Thompson South-Western 2007). The use 
of brand names allows manufacturers to differentiate their products and charge a higher price than they could charge 
for undifferentiated goods. Id. 
KALETRA®in the Dominican Republic:  
Competition Through Compulsory Licenses 
 
 
In the Dominican Republic, the price of KALETRA® (Lopinavir/Ritonavir), an HIV/AIDS 
medication produced by Abbott Laboratories, dropped by approximately 55% with the 
introduction of international generic competition in the form of a compulsory license. 
Currently, 70% of HIV patients in the Dominican Republic use the drug combination in 
KALETRA®. When the Dominican government began purchasing KALETRA® from the patent 
holder, the average price internationally was $183 USD per month of treatment, an amount 
equivalent to an average Dominican’s monthly income. However, after a compulsory license 
was issued by the Thai government in 2007, the price was reduced to $83 USD as a result of 
indirect competition. 
 
Sources: Medicins Sans Frontiers:  Untangling the Web – lopinavir/ritonavir (LPV/r) ,  
http://utw.msfaccess.org/drugs/lopinavir-ritonavir (last visited March 21, 2010), Press Release, World Health 
Organization, WHO Welcomes Abbott's Decision to Reduce the Price of Second-Line Antiretroviral Therapy (Apr. 10, 
2007). 
16 
 
protections internationally, particularly in generic source countries like India and Brazil, is 
critical.80 However, although a complete solution must be international, intellectual property 
protections in the Dominican Republic are an important piece of the public health puzzle. When 
countries like the Dominican Republic increase their intellectual property protections, they can 
cease to be able to import lower-priced generics that may be available on the international 
market. 
                                                          
80
 See e.g., Medicines Sans Fronteirs, People Living with HIV/AIDS: India must not sacrifice us in trade agreement 
with Europe, Press Release, http://www.msfaccess.org/media-room/press-releases/press-release-
detail/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1604&cHash=bc2335a5ff, at ¶ 4 (Mar. 12, 2010) (last visited Mar. 15, 2010) (“As the 
source of 92 percent of the AIDS medicines used in developing countries today, India is the pharmacy of the 
developing world. So the impact of [a potential free trade agreement between India and the European Union] also 
stretches far beyond India….”). 
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III. An Increasing Burden: The Struggle to Provide Dominicans with 
Medicines 
 
Although Dominicans face a number of challenges that impact the right to health,81 
unaffordable medicines are a major concern for patients, health care professionals and the 
government.82 Over eighty percent of spending on pharmaceuticals is paid for out of pocket by 
Dominican patients.83 According to one doctor, “*patients+ have enough money to find out 
what is wrong with them and what medicines they need but not enough money to buy 
[medications]. . . . *S+ometimes they can’t afford the whole course of medicine so they just buy 
*enough medication for+ a day or two.”84 Even with private health insurance coverage, one 
patient suffering from anemia was forced to pay $100 USD for ten iron injections.85 Though her 
treatment calls for daily injections, she can only afford to take them every other day.86 Because 
the price of medications can be a life and death matter, countries should consider the public 
health implications of their trade policy.  
 
A. The Dominican Government  
 
In an attempt to better manage the many burdens on the Dominican health system, the 
Dominican Republic passed health reform legislation 87 and created a social security system to 
provide universal health insurance coverage to Dominican citizens.88  
 
Although the 2001 legislation tasked the Dominican government with providing universal social 
security by 2012,89 less than one-third of Dominicans are currently covered.90 Despite the fact 
that not all Dominicans are covered, the government already spends one-quarter of its health 
budget on pharmaceuticals.91 With expanded social security coverage, that amount will need to 
drastically increase, or patients will be forced to forego treatment. Further, each patient is 
                                                          
81
 See Ruxin, supra note 4, at 620. Patients and civil society also indicated that Dominicans suffer from a number of 
barriers such as lack of health system infrastructure, stigmatization, etc. Interview with HIV/AIDS advocate, Red 
Dominicana de Personas que Viven con VIH/SIDA (REDOVIH), January 12, 2010, Santo Domingo, Dominican 
Republic (on file with authors). 
82
Interview with health official, Comisión Ejecutiva para la Reforma del Sector Salud (CERSS), January 14, 2010, 
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (on file with authors). 
83
 See RATHE, supra note 5, at 20.  
84
 Interview with nurse, Buen Samaritano Hospital, supra note 8. 
85
 Interview with HIV/AIDS advocate, REDOVIH, supra note 81. 
86
 Id. 
87
 See Ley No. 42-01 Ley General de Salud, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 2001, Art. 127-129; PAHO, 
supra note 10, at 29. The law created the Sistema Nacional de Salud (SNS) (national health system), Plan Básico de 
Salud (PBS) (basic health plan), and Seguro Familiar de Salud (family health insurance program). 
88
 See Ley No. 87-01, supra note 6.  
89
 RATHE, supra note 5, at 22; see also PAHO, supra note 10, at 29. 
90
 Interview with social security official, El Seguro Nacional de Salud, January 15, 2010, Santo Domingo, 
Dominican Republic (on file with authors). Currently, only 3 million (out of 10 million people) are covered. Id. 
While the Social Security system has not yet covered all Dominicans the roughly 30% of the population covered by 
the program is a significant increase from the 5.4% covered in 1996. See PAHO, supra note 10, at 19. In the same 
year, only 12.4% of Dominicans had private health insurance coverage. Id. 
91
 RATHE, supra note 5, at 20. 
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currently limited to roughly $90 USD per year for drug purchases, an amount often insufficient 
when dealing with life-threatening diseases.92 Thus, out-of-pocket expenses for Dominicans 
may remain significant regardless of the success of Dominican social security.  
 
The Dominican government will face even greater burdens as chronic diseases like cancer and 
heart disease become increasingly common in addition to infectious diseases like dengue fever 
and tuberculosis.93 Because chronic diseases often require long treatments with drugs that are 
protected by intellectual property laws, providing medicines to treat these conditions can be 
extremely expensive.94 For example, a full course of breast cancer drugs costs over $33,000 
USD in the Dominican Republic.95 A Dominican health official characterized the amounts spent 
on such high-cost chronic diseases as unsustainable.96 
 
The high price of medicine is a common thread that runs through the health challenges the 
Dominican Republic faces. The inability to pay for high-priced pharmaceuticals forces 
healthcare providers, government and individuals to make heart-breaking choices.  
 
 One healthcare provider indicated that her hospital “didn’t even want a mammogram 
machine until *the facility+ could offer cancer drugs.”97  
 
 An official with the Dominican government pointed to waiting lists for some of the most 
expensive medications that treat life-threatening diseases and are prohibitively 
expensive for most Dominicans. The waiting lists were implemented because the 
government could not afford to provide medicines for all patients in need.98 
 
 Further, the few patients lucky enough to qualify for government assistance for 
catastrophic diseases such as cancer must travel two to three times a month to Santo 
Domingo for their medications. These trips can be especially burdensome because 
patients may have to travel long distances while severely ill with only limited funds to 
pay for such travel. The frequent trips are necessary because high prices mean that the 
limited drugs the Dominican government can purchase must be carefully rationed.99 
 
 A cancer patient in Santo Domingo stated that she was only able to pay for her first 
                                                          
92
 Id. at 23. 
93
 PAHO, INDICADORES BASICOS DE SALUD, REPUBLICA DOMINICANA 2008 5 (2008). Infectious diseases caused 
over ten percent of deaths in men and women in 2005. Id. at 4. HIV/AIDS is of particular concern, with an estimated 
rate of 5.5 persons infected per 100,000 in 2007, and much higher rates in tourist areas such as Puerto Plata, which 
has an incidence of 24.6 persons infected per 100,000 citizens. Id. at 9. Worldwide, deaths from chronic diseases are 
projected to be more than two times the death rate from communicable diseases by 2015. WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION, supra note 31, at 4. 
94
 Interview with health official, SESPAS, supra note 11.  
95
 Id.  
96
 Id. 
97
 Interview with nurse, Buen Samaritano Hospital, supra note 8. 
98
 See interview with health official, SESPAS, supra note 11.  
99
 Id. See also interview with HIV/AIDS advocate, La Junta Directiva de Coalición, January 12, 2010, Santo 
Domingo, Dominican Republic (on file with authors). 
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The Efavirenz Dilemma 
 
Efavirenz (EFV) is the generic name of an important antiretroviral drug for HIV treatment 
produced by Bristol-Myers Squibb and Merck under the brand name SUSTIVA® and 
STOCRIN®. Interviews in the Dominican Republic report that EFV is patented. Because EFV 
is patented, the Dominican Republic cannot benefit from lower prices internationally.  
 
Brand-name EFV costs over three times more than the generic version  
available internationally. 
 
Because the Dominican government cannot afford to purchase EFV on the limited funds 
provided by international donors, it purchases nevirapine (NVP), a drug similar to EFV but 
whose price has decreased dramatically as a result of generic competition. However, NVP 
may cause life-threatening liver damage and weaken the immune system if given to some 
patients too early in the progression of their disease. 
 
One Dominican health official remarked that EFV is the preferable treatment because the 
government can initiate potentially life-saving treatment sooner and it avoids safety 
concerns associated with NVP.  
 
Because the government is forced to supply NVP, Dominican patients wait longer to begin 
treatment for HIV/AIDS, leaving patients with immune systems that are potentially 
weakened. These standards of initiating treatment for HIV/AIDS are lower in the Dominican 
Republic than standards set in World Health Organization guidelines and in developed 
countries.  
 
 
Source: Interview with health official, Comision Ejecutiva para la Reforma del Sector Salud, in Santo 
Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 14, 2010 (on file with authors); Rapid Advice:  Antiretroviral 
Therapy for HIV Infection in Adults and Adolescents 10-11, World Health Organization (November 
2009). 
 
course of treatment with the help of family and friends. “*I+t was a big sacrifice for them 
. . . I hated to be a burden . . . because they have their own commitments.”100 
 
 Other patients are forced to choose between feeding their families and treating their 
illness.101 One healthcare provider characterized it as a losing proposition between 
“*buying+ medication and buying lunch.”102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
100
 Interview with patient, Instituto Oncológico, January 15, 2010, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (on file 
with authors). 
101
 See United Kingdom Comm‟n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, supra note 13, at 36 (“[I]f a sick person has to pay 
more for a pharmaceutical product as a result of a patent, it means that he or she will have less to spend on other 
essentials of life such as food or shelter.”). 
102
 Interview with nurse, Buen Samaritano Hospital, supra note 8. 
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B. International Donors 
 
International funding currently plays a critical role in keeping the Dominican health system 
afloat. This funding heavily subsidizes a limited number of medications. In particular, the Global 
Fund finances the purchase of most HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis medications in the 
Dominican Republic.103 Although such funding is beneficial, there are serious questions about 
the long-term sustainability of this model.  
 
First, international assistance covers only a limited number of medications and diseases. 
Dominicans face diseases that can be just as deadly as those singled out by international donors 
such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.104 To a Dominican patient who is dying of Hepatitis 
B, for example, international assistance is of little comfort. Even patients who benefit from 
receiving free HIV/AIDS medications do not receive all the medications they need. Specifically, 
international aid provides only a limited amount of medication for the opportunistic infections 
that are often part and parcel of HIV/AIDS.105 Therefore, international assistance cannot be the 
only solution to the problem of high-priced medicine.  
 
Second, the medications selected for international funding are often limited due to price 
concerns. It has been reported that one way the Dominican government may be controlling the 
cost of medications that treat more advanced stages of AIDS, is by limiting the testing of 
HIV/AIDS patients.106 By testing these patients less frequently, those who should be receiving 
more advanced treatment may be forced to wait for appropriate medication even though their 
immune systems may be more compromised.107 In addition, HIV/AIDS patients in the 
Dominican Republic are reportedly kept on first-line drugs, where generic competition exists, 
when they should be moved to more expensive second and third-line treatments.108 Although 
                                                          
103
 See The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/programs/grant/?compid=158&grantid=239&lang=en&CountryId=DMR.   
[hereinafter Global Fund]. The Dominican Republic has received Global Fund grants since 2004, and six grant 
recipients have requested a total of $179,983,639 USD to date. Id. Thus far, the Global Fund has approved funding 
of $108,121,868 USD to combat the spread of these infectious diseases in the Dominican Republic. Id. 
104
 See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the impact of the increasing prevalence of chronic diseases in the 
Dominican Republic). 
105
 Interview with representative, Consejo Presidencial del SIDA (COPRESIDA), January 14, 2010, Santo 
Domingo, Dominican Republic (on file with authors). 
106
 Interview with HIV/AIDS advocate, Alianza Solidaria para la Lucha contra el VIH/SIDA (ASOLSIDA), January 
13, 2010, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (on file with authors). 
107
 See Médicins Sans Frontières, HIV/AIDS Treatment: Optimize Now, or Pay More Later…, 
http://www.msf.ca/news-media/news/2009/07/hiv-aids-treatment-optimize-now-or-pay-more-later/, at ¶ 4 (Jul. 20, 
2009) (“Unlike older first-line drugs, most second- and third-line drugs are patented and priced out of reach for 
patients in developing countries.”); see also National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, How HIV Causes 
AIDS, http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/topics/HIVAIDS/Understanding/howHIVCausesAIDS/, at ¶¶ 1-2 (“HIV destroys 
CD4 positive (CD4+) T cells, which are … crucial to maintaining the function of the human immune system. As 
HIV attacks these cells, the person infected with the virus is less equipped to fight off infection and disease … 
Antiretroviral medicines can help reduce the amount of virus in the body, preserve CD4+ T cells and dramatically 
slow the destruction of the immune system.”). 
108
 See interview with HIV/AIDS advocate, REDOVIH, supra note 81; see interview with HIV/AIDS advocate, 
ASOLSIDA, supra note 106 (discussing how the Dominican Republic uses CD4 levels, an immune system indicator 
used to tell when a patient should be moved from first-line medicines to a more aggressive treatment, is set at a 
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the consequences of such actions can mean death,109 patients may not be given the best 
possible medicines because affordably-priced generics are not available. Thus, even 
international assistance is forced to contend with the barrier of price. 
 
Finally, international funding may not always be available to the Dominican Republic. One 
government attorney working on health reform efforts noted that there is no guarantee that 
the Global Fund will renew its grants.110 And a health official acknowledged that the Dominican 
government will be responsible for providing medicines for these diseases when assistance 
ends or is interrupted.111 Significant doubts exist about the government’s ability to adequately 
compensate for a loss of international assistance.112 One HIV/AIDS advocate recalled how civil 
society scrambled to find funds in anticipation of providing anti-retroviral medication when 
international funding renewal appeared to be in jeopardy in 2009.113 Further, according to 
some interviews, the Dominican government has been forced to borrow medicines from poorer 
countries like Haiti or purchase medicines at a higher price from the name-brand manufacturer 
to ensure continued treatment.114 One Dominican HIV/AIDS advocate stated that “*i+f 
international funding runs out, treatment runs out.”115  
 
International assistance is a double-edged sword. Although it plays a critical role in saving the 
lives of Dominicans, if funding were stopped or decreased, the consequences could be dire. 
Because the Dominican government cannot rely on unlimited international aid, it must find its 
own solution to the problem of life-saving medicines priced out of reach. 
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IV. U.S. Pressure: Compounding the Price Problem  
 
Despite its commitment to the Doha Declaration,116 the United States has pursued free trade 
agreements, like DR-CAFTA, that increase intellectual property levels117 and, in the process, 
threaten to undermine access to medicines. In some instances, these increased obligations are 
being implemented in ways that are even more stringent than the highly developed intellectual 
property protections in the United States.118  
 
DR-CAFTA is expected to increase pharmaceutical prices in the Dominican Republic over the 
next two decades,119 which will likely undermine the Dominican government’s efforts to 
provide life-saving medicines and force individual Dominicans to continue purchasing medicine 
at unaffordable prices. Ultimately, U.S. promotion of heightened intellectual property 
protections could exacerbate existing public health difficulties in the Dominican Republic. 
 
As a staunch advocate of strong intellectual property protections, the United States uses a 
variety of approaches to pressure countries to increase levels of intellectual property 
protection.120 These tactics often exploit the disparities in bargaining power caused by the 
dependence of many developing countries, like the Dominican Republic, on trade with the 
United States.121 During DR-CAFTA negotiations, this dependence resulted in the Dominican 
government accepting TRIPS-plus intellectual property provisions.122 Today, the United States 
continues to promote these already heightened obligations through training and technical 
assistance that fails to inform the Dominican government of the more public health conscious 
approaches it may take, including those the United States itself employs.123 These intellectual 
property efforts favor multinational pharmaceutical companies at the expense of public health 
and may be interfering with the Dominican Republic’s ability to uphold the right to health of its 
citizens. 
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Despite this pressure on the Dominican Republic to accept and implement heightened 
intellectual property provisions in DR-CAFTA, the United States has recognized that these 
provisions have negative consequences for developing countries and undermine the public 
health protections affirmed in the Doha Declaration.124 Partly in recognition of these negative 
consequences, the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives and the 
Office of the United States Trade Representative revisited pending free trade agreements to 
substantially revise some of these standards and reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the Doha 
Declaration.125 This change in policy (“New U.S. Trade Policy”) has been offered to Colombia, 
Peru, and Panama in free trade agreements that incorporate these more favorable provisions in 
addition to revised labor and environmental provisions.126 Dominicans, however, do not benefit 
from the New U.S. Trade Policy and are forced to implement heightened intellectual property 
obligations that are no longer in line with U.S. policy and may have negative consequences for 
public health. 
 
A. Unequal Partners: The Non-Negotiation of Intellectual Property in DR-CAFTA 
 
The Dominican government negotiated DR-CAFTA with one primary goal: preserving its vital 
trade relationship with the United States.127 This trade imbalance is reflected in the reliance of 
the Dominican Republic on the United States as a market.128 According to one former DR-CAFTA 
negotiator, as the Dominican government watched Central American countries enter further 
into free trade negotiations with the United States, it became fearful of losing U.S. market 
share to its neighbors and joined negotiations.129  
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Further weakening the Dominican government’s bargaining power was the late stage at which 
it began trade discussions. Negotiations between the United States and the Dominican Republic 
lasted just three months,130 largely because the other participating Central American countries 
had already completed a substantial portion of the agreement.131 Several former DR-CAFTA 
negotiators reported that Dominican negotiators were relatively inexperienced.132 One noted 
that “we needed handholding as a country and as negotiators *during this process+.”133 Further, 
DR-CAFTA’s intellectual property provisions were not negotiated until the final round, which 
may have influenced Dominican acquiescence to unfavorable terms because negotiators did 
not want to risk provisions on textiles and sugar that had already been agreed upon.134 The 
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enticement of these benefits and inexperience of the negotiators may have prevented the 
Dominican Republic from negotiating significant changes in intellectual property provisions.  
 
The United States acknowledged that it would pursue heightened intellectual property 
protections in DR-CAFTA.135 These protections have been characterized as some of the most 
onerous among other U.S. free trade agreements with developing countries,136 and surpass 
obligations under TRIPS.137 Yet, despite the United States’ stated desire to include heightened 
intellectual property protection, parties to DR-CAFTA signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
as part of the Agreement stating that DR-CAFTA’s intellectual property chapter does not affect 
a country’s ability to take “necessary measures to protect public health by promoting access to 
medicines for all.”138  
 
Although the legal effects of this Memorandum are untested, U.S. activities during and after 
DR-CAFTA negotiations call into question its commitment to the document’s principles. One DR-
CAFTA negotiator reported that the United States focused on protecting the multinational 
pharmaceutical industry during the negotiations.139 Since the negotiation of DR-CAFTA, the 
United States has provided technical assistance on DR-CAFTA implementation that may not 
fully embrace or inform the Dominican Republic about safeguards that could be implemented 
to address public health concerns. By promoting policies that may raise the price of medicines 
in the Dominican Republic, the United States may be interfering with the Dominican Republic’s 
ability to realize the right to health for its citizens. 
 
B. Beyond TRIPS, Beyond the New U.S. Trade Policy: DR-CAFTA Intellectual Property 
Provisions 
 
DR-CAFTA imposes several intellectual property provisions that go beyond those contained in 
TRIPS and the New U.S. Trade Policy. These provisions could negatively affect public health in 
the Dominican Republic and are compounded by U.S. technical assistance on DR-CAFTA 
implementation that may not present the public health safeguards present in U.S. law to the 
Dominican government. Without these safeguards, Dominican law may sometimes go beyond 
highly developed U.S. intellectual property law. This combination of DR-CAFTA provisions and 
U.S. technical assistance could drive up the price of medicines in a way that is devastating for 
the lives of many ordinary Dominicans. 
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This report focuses on three DR-CAFTA provisions that impose obligations beyond TRIPS: 1) 
patent extensions, 2) data exclusivity, and 3) patent linkage.140 In examining these provisions, 
comparisons are made between the Dominican law implementing DR-CAFTA,141 TRIPS and U.S. 
law. These comparisons show that the Dominican Republic may be missing opportunities to 
implement intellectual property protections in a manner that protects the right to health. 
 
1. Patent Extensions 
 
Patent extensions increase the protected term of a patent.142 Extensions are designed to 
compensate for government delays in granting a patent application or approving a drug for 
market.143 Compensation is given by extending the patent holder’s monopoly over the 
pharmaceutical product.144 However, by extending this monopoly, a patent extension further 
delays the entry of competition into the market and, thus, may keep prices artificially high.145  
 
The patent extension provision in DR-CAFTA imposes obligations on the Dominican Republic 
that exceed those contained in TRIPS. Although TRIPS requires that patent protection be given 
for twenty years, it makes no reference to patent extensions. DR-CAFTA, however, requires 
patent extensions be given for delays in granting a patent application or marketing approval.146 
Thus, the patent extension provision in DR-CAFTA creates additional protections for 
pharmaceutical companies not contemplated by TRIPS. 
 
U.S. law contains patent extension provisions similar to those in DR-CAFTA, but with important 
limits. For example, in the United States, the total protective term of a patent given a patent 
extension for a regulatory delay cannot exceed fourteen years from marketing approval,147 
while this limit does not exist in Dominican law.148 Thus, the Dominican law implementing DR-
CAFTA may not protect public health to the same degree. 
 
The problem of patent extensions is particularly acute in developing countries. In the United 
States, it takes over three years on average to complete the patent application process.149 In 
developing countries like the Dominican Republic, which have far fewer resources at their 
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disposal than the United States,150 administrative delays in the patent office and drug 
regulatory authority are not uncommon.151 Thus, patent extensions impose a double burden on 
developing countries by effectively punishing them for their lack of resources by extending 
monopolies that increase drug prices and further strain government budgets. 
 
Patent extensions affect public health by forcing patients to wait even longer than the twenty-
year term established by TRIPS for generic medicines and the competition they bring to the 
market.152 DR-CAFTA has not been in effect long enough in the Dominican Republic to see how 
patent extensions will be granted and their impact.153 However, the United States has 
recognized the potential negative consequences of patent extensions, which are now optional 
for developing countries under the New U.S. Trade Policy.154 Unfortunately, the Dominican 
Republic has yet to benefit from this favorable shift in policy. 
 
2. Data Exclusivity 
 
Data exclusivity is a form of intellectual property protection for pharmaceutical safety, efficacy 
and quality data.155 Before a pharmaceutical can be sold, data from clinical research trials must 
typically be submitted to a country’s drug regulatory authority to show safety, efficacy and 
quality.156 Generally, when a generic manufacturer wants to enter the market, the 
manufacturer relies on this data to show that its drug is similarly safe and effective.157 But, data 
that is protected by an exclusivity regime cannot be used or relied upon by a third party, such 
as a generic manufacturer, for a period time.158 If generic manufacturers cannot rely on this 
data, they must either wait until the data exclusivity expires or hold their own clinical research 
trials, which are often prohibitively expensive and can raise ethical questions by duplicating 
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unnecessary testing on human beings for commercial purposes.159 Thus, data exclusivity 
prevents generic manufacturers from entering the market, providing competition and driving 
down prices.  
 
Data exclusivity is completely independent from patents and creates an additional layer of 
monopoly protection.160 Whereas patents reward innovation, data exclusivity rewards 
investment and effort.161 Protecting data is particularly problematic in developing countries 
because brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers typically attempt to sell their products in 
developed markets like the United States before attempting to extract profit from developing 
countries.162 A pharmaceutical manufacturer could wait until patent protections or data 
exclusivity in developed countries expired, and then use data exclusivity to receive an 
additional term of monopoly in developing countries like the Dominican Republic.163 The result 
is that the developing nations, which have the greatest need for lower cost drugs, may have to 
wait the longest to obtain them.164 
 
Data exclusivity provisions in DR-CAFTA can be characterized as exceeding those in TRIPS.165 
TRIPS requires countries to protect undisclosed data from unfair commercial uses and certain 
types of disclosure.166 TRIPS leaves governments with broad discretion in implementing data 
protection regimes,167 and, consequently, allows for public health considerations.168 The United 
States, however, has chosen to adopt a more extensive data exclusivity regime that flatly 
requires five years of protection for new products containing a new chemical entity and three 
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years of protection for new uses or indications.169 It has attempted to promote this more 
extensive data exclusivity regime in other countries through free trade agreements like DR-
CAFTA.170 Under DR-CAFTA, data submitted for regulatory approval is given at least five years of 
protection regardless of the purpose of its use.171 Further, some products that do not contain a 
new chemical entity are protected when they would not be under TRIPS.172 Thus, where 
generics would have an opportunity to enter the market under TRIPS (e.g. under a compulsory 
license) DR-CAFTA could unilaterally prohibit entry for at least five years. This extension of the 
monopoly may have life or death consequences for patients who are unable to obtain lower-
priced medicines.   
 
Studies show that one of the main factors in increasing the price of medicines in developing 
countries is data exclusivity.173 Perhaps unsurprisingly then, interviews with individuals who 
work with intellectual property and pharmaceuticals revealed that data protection is the most 
contentious of the three DR-CAFTA provisions studied in this report.174  
 
Recognizing in part the problematic nature of data exclusivity provisions for developing 
countries, the New U.S. Trade Policy contains a TRIPS-plus data exclusivity obligation that is 
more amenable to public health concerns.175 For example, under New U.S. Trade Policy, data 
exclusivity is limited to new “chemical entities” rather than a new “product,”176 a distinction 
that limits the pharmaceuticals that qualify for protection.177 Additionally, the period of data 
exclusivity is shifted from “at least five years” to a reasonable period, normally five years.178 
Further, the New U.S. Trade Policy establishes a public health exception that authorizes 
countries to take measures to protect public health notwithstanding data exclusivity.179 These 
changes in U.S. policy significantly improve the balance between economic incentives and 
public health considerations over the provisions contained in DR-CAFTA.  
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3. Patent Linkage 
 
Patent linkage refers to a system where drug regulatory bodies are linked with patent 
enforcement.180 If a drug is patented, the drug regulatory agency generally cannot approve the 
generic version of the drug for purchase and must inform the patent owner that someone else 
has tried to obtain approval to sell the drug.181 Most linkage systems require the drug 
regulatory authority to determine whether a patent exists for a drug before granting marketing 
approval to sell that drug.182 Though patent linkage mechanisms can be designed in different 
ways, designing a linkage system that does not unduly impair a generic manufacturer’s ability to 
place drugs on the market can be difficult for developing countries.183 
 
Unlike DR-CAFTA, TRIPS does not require a country’s drug regulatory body to be linked with 
patent enforcement. DR-CAFTA imposes an increased burden on the Dominican drug regulatory 
authority by requiring it to 1) refrain from granting marketing approval of a patented drug 
during the term of the drug’s patent, and 2) notify the patent owner of a generic 
manufacturer’s request for marketing approval.184 By requiring these two actions by the drug 
regulatory authority, the linkage system required by DR-CAFTA places the burden of patent 
enforcement on the Dominican government to protect the patent rather than on the patent 
owner.185 
 
Although the United States adopted a patent linkage system,186 U.S. law contains significant 
safeguards that can be used to protect public health.187 For example, U.S. law requires patent 
owners to identify and list patents in the publicly available Orange Book, a public database 
where patents and data exclusivity are listed,188 and to affirmatively enforce their patent in 
court after being informed of a generic manufacturer’s attempt to gain marketing approval.189 
An additional safeguard under U.S. law incentivizes generic production by limiting marketing 
approval delays of generic products to no more than thirty months.190 Further, the U.S. law 
provides for an even greater incentive for generic manufacturers to challenge the validity of 
patents by rewarding a generic manufacturer that successfully challenges a patent with 180 
days to exclusively sell their generic product.191 Even though the U.S. patent linkage system has 
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faced criticism for hindering generic competition,192 these flexibilities in U.S. law are an 
example of the highly developed nature of U.S. intellectual property law that tries to establish a 
balance between patent holders and consumers.193 
 
In contrast, the Dominican Republic has implemented only one of these flexibilities in 
Dominican law: establishment of a public register that lists patented pharmaceutical 
products.194 A generic manufacturer in the Dominican Republic does not have similar 
mechanisms contained in U.S. law to challenge the patent in order to accelerate generic 
marketing approval. Without the opportunity and incentive for generic manufacturers to 
challenge patents under Dominican law, the drug regulatory authority may assume that patents 
are valid and block the marketing approval of a drug even if the patent is likely invalid.195 By 
failing to implement critical safeguards, the Dominican Republic creates a complex patent 
linkage system that will impose administrative and legal burdens that could provide patent 
holders with more protection than under U.S. law.196 
 
Recognizing the unique burdens patent linkage places on drug regulatory authorities in 
developing countries, the New U.S. Trade Policy reverses the trend of tasking drug regulatory 
agencies with enforcing patents.197 Under the New U.S. Trade Policy, patent holders must be 
notified that another person seeks to market a product covered under the patent.198 After this 
notification, the patent holder may be required to seek enforcement to prevent marketing 
approval of the allegedly infringing product.199 Thus, the burden of patent enforcement is 
placed on the patent holder to seek available remedies, and not on the drug regulatory 
authority to enforce patents.200 Further, provisions in recent free trade agreements explicitly 
recognize that generic manufacturers can challenge pharmaceutical patent validity or 
applicability.201 These changes in U.S. policy significantly improve the balance between patent 
holders and public health from the provisions contained in DR-CAFTA. 
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C. Beyond TRIPS, Beyond the New Trade Policy: DR-CAFTA Implementation 
 
Despite the change in U.S. trade policy, the United States continues to promote the use and 
enforcement of TRIPS-plus provisions in the Dominican Republic that go beyond obligations in 
U.S. law and the New U.S. Trade Policy.202 This promotion largely occurs through the United 
States Agency for International Development (“USAID”), which funds, selects and hires 
consultants to provide training and guidance to Dominican authorities on DR-CAFTA 
implementation.203  
 
The Dominican generic industry in particular expressed concern that this USAID guidance is 
biased towards interpreting and implementing DR-CAFTA in a way that promotes strong 
intellectual property protection without providing equal information about safeguards that can 
be used to promote public health.204 This bias could be critically damaging if decision-makers in 
the Dominican Republic are not aware of the legal flexibilities to protect public health that exist 
in U.S. law. Demonstrating this lack of knowledge, Dominican government officials expressed 
confusion about the requirements needed to issue a compulsory license.205 And, many of those 
interviewed were unaware of public health safeguards that exist in U.S. law or the New U.S. 
Trade Policy.206 Without accurate education and balanced training about what DR-CAFTA 
provisions require, the Dominican government may choose not to use pro-public health 
flexibilities, which limits the government’s ability to respond to public health needs.  
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Although the willingness to provide financial assistance and capacity-building is commendable, 
the United States loses credibility by directing Dominican authorities how to implement 
Dominican law without providing balanced information about flexibilities that the Dominican 
Republic can use to protect the public’s health.  
 
 
The Pharmaceutical Industry: Regional Lobbying 
 
Dominican government officials report that powerful pharmaceutical companies 
also attempt to influence Dominican policy in ways that could undermine the right 
to health. 
 
In 2009, the Dominican Republic and eight Central American countries considered 
organizing a regional drug purchasing program for thirty-six high-priced drugs. 
Because each country has little individual purchasing power, the regional drug 
purchasing program would have enabled the countries to pool their resources for 
additional bargaining and purchasing power with multinational pharmaceutical 
companies. This effort was supported by the finding that only thirteen drugs 
consume ninety percent of the region’s public health budget.  
 
In response to these efforts, a pharmaceutical lobbying organization sent a letter to 
the government of each country questioning the strategy and arguing that these 
measures might violate international and national legal obligations. The lobbying 
organization, FEDEFARMA, represents companies such as Eli Lilly, Merck, Sanofi 
Aventis and Pfizer. 
 
Sources: Letter, 2009 PAHO Reunión del Sector Salud de Centroamérica y República Dominicana (on file with 
authors) 
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V. Forecasting the Effects of DR-CAFTA in the Dominican Republic 
 
TRIPS-plus provisions such as those found in DR-CAFTA can profoundly impact access to 
medicines.207 The experience of other developing countries is illustrative. Jordan, for example, 
experienced a twenty percent increase in the price of pharmaceuticals five years after its free 
trade agreement with the United States.208 Prices in Jordan were two to ten times more for 
some new medicines than those in Egypt, a market which was not subject to heightened 
intellectual property provisions imposed by U.S. free trade agreements, after its free trade 
agreement with the United States.209 In Guatemala, DR-CAFTA decreased competition by 
forcing some generics off of the national market and delaying the entry of new generics into 
the market even when those generic medicines were available in the United States.210 Research 
indicates that the Dominican Republic is also likely to experience an increase in pharmaceutical 
prices because of DR-CAFTA.211 
 
The price of pharmaceuticals in the Dominican Republic is expected to increase by nine to 
fifteen percent by 2027 as a result of DR-CAFTA based on a recent study by Fundación Plenitud 
and the Pan-American Health Organization.212 The majority of this price increase is attributed to 
the effects of data exclusivity.213 With increasing prices under DR-CAFTA, the Dominican 
government may face significant difficulty in providing its citizens with the medications they 
need.  
 
Such an increase in prices could be deadly for Dominican patients who are affected in many 
different ways. A nurse in the Dominican Republic explained that patients currently cannot 
afford to take “anything that is non-generic” on a daily basis.214 Even though HIV/AIDS 
medicines are largely free for patients in the Dominican Republic, HIV/AIDS advocates noted 
that doctors delay some HIV/AIDS testing because “if *a doctor+ doesn’t prescribe drugs, he 
saves the government money.”215 Despite the fact that the Dominican Republic receives mostly 
free HIV/AIDS medicines through international donors, more advanced patients require more 
expensive treatment which may not have been accounted for in the Dominican health budget 
or grants from international donors.216 
 
Dominican government officials and civil society also expressed concern about the sustainability 
of the Dominican Republic’s public health programs if prices increase as projected.217 One 
health official noted that the Dominican government currently spends over $10 million USD on 
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pharmaceuticals that treat chronic diseases, and that this spending is unsustainable.218 Other 
countries that have implemented heightened intellectual property provisions as a result of free 
trade agreements with the United States faced similar problems. For example, in Jordan, the 
rise in pharmaceutical prices has threatened the sustainability of public health programs.219 The 
Dominican government could also be forced to spend resources on training and the 
implementation of TRIPS-plus provisions to the detriment of other public health needs. Patent 
linkage, for example, forces the Dominican drug regulatory agency to spend resources on 
patent verification and notification. This burden is in addition to its public health 
responsibilities, which include assuring the safety, efficacy and quality of pharmaceuticals.220 
With scarce resources, the implementation of DR-CAFTA itself further strains the Dominican 
budget from health priorities and requires additional resources to ensure that DR-CAFTA is 
implemented in a way that safeguards the right to health.  
 
Outdated TRIPS-plus provisions in DR-CAFTA could critically limit the Dominican Republic’s 
ability to uphold the right to health for its citizens. Further, price increases threaten to 
overwhelm the Dominican government’s efforts to implement meaningful social security 
protection for its citizens. Without such reform, Dominican citizens will continue to struggle to 
pay for drugs they cannot afford. Though the United States has extended more favorable 
intellectual property provisions to other developing countries, Dominicans do not currently 
benefit from this shift in U.S. trade policy. Instead, Dominicans will face rising drug prices under 
DR-CAFTA.221 The Dominican Republic should also be able to benefit from these less stringent 
intellectual property provisions that better allow developing countries to uphold the right to 
health. 
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VI. Conclusion  
 
The Dominican Republic will face increasing difficulties in protecting public health because of 
the heightened intellectual property provisions in DR-CAFTA and its implementing legislation. 
The human right to health, as contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, creates obligations for both the United States and the Dominican Republic. 
Heightened intellectual property provisions in DR-CAFTA and subsequent state practices may 
implicate the moral and legal obligations of both countries to uphold the right to health. 
 
Currently, the Dominican Republic is unable to provide medications for all citizens. More than 
eighty percent of spending on pharmaceuticals is out of pocket despite an often inadequate 
average annual income of about $3000 USD.222 And, although the Dominican government is in 
the process of attempting to increase insurance coverage for its citizens, the public health 
budget is already strained and the medicine expenditure for each patient may be insufficient 
for many,223 raising further questions about the reform’s viability. Further, the Dominican 
government relies heavily on international donors to provide for some life-saving medicine, a 
reliance that likely cannot be sustained.224  
 
The future may not be more promising: the effects of DR-CAFTA have the potential to 
exacerbate these current pressing public health challenges. The TRIPS-plus intellectual property 
provisions in DR-CAFTA will likely have a profound impact on access to medicines and may 
hinder efforts by the Dominican Republic to protect public health. These provisions could 
significantly limit the Dominican Republic’s ability to safeguard public health through 
internationally recognized legal flexibilities that were guaranteed under TRIPS and reaffirmed 
by the Doha Declaration. These provisions could also limit generic competition, allowing 
pharmaceutical companies to set and keep prices of new and already expensive drugs 
artificially high. Consistent with studies from other countries on the effects of TRIPS-plus 
provisions, the provisions in DR-CAFTA will likely increase pharmaceutical prices in the 
Dominican Republic. 
 
The consequences of TRIPS-plus provisions, like those in DR-CAFTA, have been recognized as 
harming developing countries by keeping lower priced drugs from those who need them.225 
Under the New U.S. Trade Policy, developing countries have been offered more favorable 
intellectual property provisions which make patent extensions optional and allow for a more 
flexible data exclusivity and patent linkage regime.226 Despite this recognition that heightened 
intellectual property provisions undermine public health protection, the United States’ policy in 
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the Dominican Republic has not similarly shifted. Further, U.S. technical assistance in the 
Dominican Republic may undermine the balance between intellectual property protections and 
public health by failing to provide information about pro-public health safeguards that could be 
implemented in Dominican law.  
 
The United States has the capacity to save lives in the Dominican Republic by promoting a pro-
public health trade policy. With this capacity comes the moral responsibility to consider the life 
and death impact of intellectual property provisions on Dominicans. Our recommendations 
provide possible ways to address this critical issue and alleviate this significant burden on the 
Dominican Republic. 
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VII. Recommendations 
 
To promote access to affordable pharmaceuticals in the Dominican Republic, the Georgetown 
Human Rights Action/Human Rights Institute Fact-Finding Team makes the following 
recommendations to the Government of the United States of America: 
 
1. The United States should bring DR-CAFTA implementation in line with New U.S. 
Trade Policy, specifically:  
a. Patent extensions for pharmaceuticals should be made optional. 
b. At a minimum, data exclusivity should be limited to “a reasonable period” for 
undisclosed and required data, and should protect only new chemical 
entities. Data exclusivity should also be subject to an exception to protect 
public health in accordance with the Doha Declaration. 
c. Patent linkage systems should be optional, clearly allowing countries to place 
the burden on patent holders to enforce their rights. 
 
2. The United States should ensure that training and funding are provided in a way that 
strengthens the Dominican Republic’s capacity to implement pro-public health 
policies, including training on public health safeguards such as those provided in 
TRIPS and U.S. law in addition to DR-CAFTA obligations. 
 
3. The United States should publicly recognize the right of the Dominican Republic and 
other trade partners to use TRIPS flexibilities consistent with U.S. commitments 
under the Doha Declaration. In future negotiations, the United States should refrain 
from promoting intellectual property provisions that inhibit a government’s ability to 
advance public health. 
 
To promote access to affordable pharmaceuticals in the Dominican Republic, the Georgetown 
Human Rights Action/Human Rights Institute Fact-Finding Team makes the following 
recommendations to the Government of the Dominican Republic: 
 
1. The Dominican Republic should utilize TRIPS flexibilities where necessary to protect 
public health. To this end, the Dominican Republic should consider: 
a. Identifying public health needs that merit the use of TRIPS flexibilities. 
b. Clarifying and publicizing the procedures for obtaining a compulsory license. 
c. Providing training on TRIPS flexibilities to relevant government agencies and 
civil society. 
 
2. The Dominican Republic should further study and address the effects that 
intellectual property laws can have on access to medicine in the Dominican Republic. 
To this end, the Dominican Republic should consider: 
a. Commissioning a study on access to medicine in the Dominican Republic. 
b. Promoting more active involvement of health officials in trade and 
intellectual property negotiations. 
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APPENDIX I. Organizations Consulted in the Dominican Republic  
 
Hospitals and Clinics  
- Hospital El Buen Samaritano, La Romana, Dominican Republic  
- Hospital General Plaza de la Salud, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic 
- Instituto Oncológico, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic 
 
Dominican Government 
- Comisión Ejecutiva para la Reforma del Sector Salud (CERSS) 
- Consejo Presidencial del SIDA (COPRESIDA) 
- Consejo Nacional de Salud (CNS) 
- Presidencia de la Republica 
- La Dirección de Comercio Exterior (DICOEX) 
- Oficinia Nacional de la Propiedad Industrial (ONAPI) 
- La Programa de Medicamentos Esencial/ Central de Apoyo Logístico (PROMESE-CAL) 
- Secretaria de Estado de Relaciones Exteriores (SEREX) 
- Secretaria de Estado de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social (SESPAS) 
- El Seguro Nacional de Salud (SENASA) 
 
United States Government 
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
- United States Commercial Service (USCS) 
 
Industry Representatives 
- Asociación de Industrias Farmacéuticas Dominicana (INFADOMI) 
- Asociación de Representantes de Importadores de Medicamentos (ARAPF) 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations  
- AIDS Free World 
- Alianza Solidaria para la Lucha contra el VIH/SIDA (ASOLSIDA) 
- Asociación Dominicana Pro-Bienestar de la Familia (PROFAMILIA)  
- Consejo Presidencial del SIDA (COPRESIDA) 
- La Junta Directiva de Coalición 
- Fundación Plenitud 
- Fundación Global Democracia y Desarollo (FUNGLODE) 
- Fundación Grupo Paloma 
- Red Dominicana de Personas que Viven con VIH/SIDA (REDOVIH) 
 
Other Professionals 
- Dominican legal practitioners, trade negotiators, medical practitioners, government 
consultants. 
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APPENDIX II. Comparison of Intellectual Property Provisions 
 
Patent Extensions: 
 
TRIPS 
Agreement 
DR Law 
No. 20-00 
DR-CAFTA DR Law No. 424-06 U.S. Hatch Waxman Act 
No patent 
extensions. 
No patent 
extensions. 
Art. 15.9(6)(a)-(b) 
 
Patent term extensions due to 
delays in regulatory review: an 
extension of the patent term shall 
be granted to compensate the 
patent owner for unreasonable 
curtailment of the effective patent 
term resulting from a delay in the 
marketing approval process. 
 
Patent term extensions due to 
delays in the grant of a patent: the 
term of a patent shall be extended 
to compensate for unreasonable 
delays that occur in granting the 
patent.  Unreasonable delay shall 
at least include a delay in the 
issuance of a patent of more than 
5 years from the date of filing of 
the application, or 3 years after a 
request for examination of the 
application has been made, 
whichever is later, provided that 
periods attributable to actions of 
the patent applicant need not be 
included in the determination of 
such delays. 
 
 
Art. 2: 
 
Patent term extensions due 
to delays in regulatory 
review: the term of a patent 
shall be extended for 
unreasonable delays in 
regulatory review, defined as 
more than 2.5 years since 
the request for marketing 
approval. 
 
Patent term extensions due 
to delays in the grant of a 
patent: the term of a patent 
shall be extended for 
unreasonable delays in the 
granting of a patent, defined 
as more than 5 years from 
filing or 3 years from the 
request of examination, 
whichever is later.  
35 U.S.C. § 156 
 
Patent term extensions due to delays in 
regulatory review: the portion of the patent 
term during which the patentee is unable to 
market product while awaiting government 
approval is restored. 
 
35 U.S.C. § 154 
 
Patent term extensions due to delays in the 
granting of a patent: the portion of patent 
term during which the patentee is unable to 
market the product while awaiting 
government approval if more than 3 years 
from filing is restored. Exceptions: delay 
requested by the applicant, interference 
procedure, appeals, etc. 
 
Conditions & Limitations: 
- Applicant must file the request with the 
U.S. patent office within 60 days of the 
product approval by the agency. 
- Only one 5 year extension period can be 
sought per product. 
- The restoration period cannot be longer 
than five years and the total effective patent 
protection, including the restoration period, 
must not exceed fourteen years following 
FDA approval. 
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Data Exclusivity: 
 
 TRIPS 
Agreement 
DR Law No. 20-00  DR-CAFTA DR Law No. 424-06 Hatch Waxman 
Act 
Article 39.3: 
 
Members, when 
requiring, as a 
condition of approving 
the marketing of 
pharmaceutical or of 
agricultural chemical 
products which utilizes 
new chemical entities, 
the submission of 
undisclosed test or 
other data, the 
origination of which 
involves a 
considerable effort, 
shall protect such data 
against unfair 
commercial use. In 
addition, Members 
shall protect such data 
against disclosure, 
except where 
necessary to protect 
the public, or unless 
steps are taken to 
ensure that the data 
are protected against 
unfair commercial use. 
 
 
Art. 179: 
 
No data exclusivity but 
contains unfair 
commercial use 
protection.  
 
Where the marketing 
authority requires the 
presentation of secret 
data or information, 
these are protected from 
unfair commercial use by 
third parties. The secret 
data or information is 
protected against 
disclosure.  An exception 
is when it is necessary to 
protect the public or 
when adequate measures 
have been adopted to 
ensure that the data or 
information are 
protected against their 
unfair commercial use by 
third parties.  
Art. 15.10: 
 
Parties are prohibited from 
granting marketing approval 
for a generic product that relies 
on the originator’s data or 
marketing approval for at least 
five years from the date of 
approval in the Party. 
 
A Party may require that the 
person providing the 
information in the other 
territory seek approval in the 
territory of the Party within 
five years of obtaining 
marketing approval in the 
other territory. 
 
Each Party shall protect such 
undisclosed information 
against disclosure except 
where necessary to protect the 
public. No Party may consider 
information within the public 
domain as undisclosed data. If 
any undisclosed information 
concerning safety and efficacy 
information is disclosed, the 
Party is still required to protect 
such information from unfair 
commercial use. 
Art. 32(1): 
 
An applicant who files for 
marketing approval for a 
product containing a new 
chemical entity or active moiety 
receives data protection for at 
least five years from the date of 
approval of the product. 
Regulatory approval may not be 
granted to a second applicant 
that relies on data supplied by 
the first applicant.   The Party 
submitting marketing approval 
information must seek approval 
in the Dominican Republic 
within five years of obtaining 
marketing approval in another 
territory. 
 
The information will be 
protected from disclosure, 
except when necessary to 
protect public health.  No Party 
may consider information within 
the public domain as 
undisclosed data.  If any 
undisclosed information 
concerning safety and efficacy 
information is disclosed, the 
Party is still required to protect 
such information from unfair 
commercial use. 
21 U.S.C. § 355: 
 
An applicant who files for 
marketing approval for a 
product containing a new 
chemical entity or active 
moiety receives data 
protection for five years 
from the date of approval 
of the product. 
Regulatory approval may 
not be granted to a 
second applicant that 
relies on data supplied by 
the first applicant.     
 
An applicant who files for 
marketing approval for a  
product containing a new 
use or indication when 
the applicant has 
conducted essential, new 
clinical trials receives data 
protection for three 
years.  
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Patent Linkage: 
 
Trips 
Agreement 
DR Law 
No. 20-00 
DR-CAFTA DR Law No.  424-06 Hatch Waxman Act 
None. None. Art. 15.10.2(a):  
 
Parties shall implement 
patent linkage systems in 
their marketing approval 
process to prevent a generic 
from marketing a product 
covered by a patent. 
 
The patent owner shall be 
informed of the request and 
the identity of any such other 
person who requests approval 
to enter the market during 
the term of a patent identified 
as claiming the approved 
product or its approved use. 
 
Art. 32: 
 
A drug manufacturer seeking marketing 
approval of a new pharmaceutical 
product must provide the government 
with a list of patents that protect the 
product or its approved use in the DR. The 
Dominican government is charged with 
establishing a public register listing the 
patents that involve pharmaceutical 
products. 
 
If a patent exists, marketing approval is 
not allowed unless:   
  
A.) A notarized sworn statement is 
provided indicating that there is no 
patent in effect in the Dominican 
Republic protecting the product  or 
use; 
B.) Written authorization is provided 
from the patent holder; 
C.) Or, a notarized sworn statement is 
provided indicating that  the 
applicant shall not enter the market 
prior to patent expiration. 
 
The Dominican government is also 
obligated to inform the patent holder of 
the application and identify the person 
seeking marketing approval during the life 
of the patent. 
21 U.S.C. § 355 
 
New drug applications must include 
patent information.  Patent lists are 
published in an online “Orange 
Book.” 
 
Under U.S. law, if a patent exists 
there is a fourth option for generic 
manufacturers that does not exist 
under DR Law 424-06.  Generics 
may provide a statement by which 
they challenge the patent validity or 
application. Patent holders receive 
a maximum 30-month stay of 
marketing approval where generics 
are challenging existing patents and 
only if the patent holder initiates 
litigation against generic applicants 
within 45 days. 
 
Generic applicants that successfully 
challenge a patent receive 180 days 
of exclusivity. 
 
 
